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Abstract 
The broad objective of the study is to examine the determinants of board size and 
composition in Nigerian and Malaysian quoted banks.The population of the study 
is the universe of banks quoted on the Nigerian and Malaysian Stock Exchanges 
as at 31st December 2014. A sample of fourteen (14) banks for Nigeria and a 
sample of eighteen (18) banks for Malaysia were purposively selected for the 
study. The study employed panel regression technique based on the quality of 
unbiasedness, increased data point, and control for individual heterogeneity. To 
test the accuracy of the model, we employed the classical regression assumption 
tests of normality, heteroskedasticity, serial correlation and multicollinearity. The 
study revealed a significant relationship between firm size and board size and 
composition.The impact of firm size on board size was positive in the case of 
Nigeria but negative in the Malaysian case. The impact on board composition is 
positive in the case of Malaysia but negative in the Nigerian case. The 
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relationship between free cash flow and board size was negative but significant 
only in the Malaysian case. The impact of free cash flow on board composition 
was positive and significant only in the Nigerian case. The mixed result between 
firm size and board size and composition calls for moderately sized firms. The 
increased free cash flow increases the potentials for private benefit and calls for 
increased ratio of external to internal board members for more effective 
monitoring. 
Key words: Board composition, board size, free cash flows, firm age, firm size 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Accounting literature is replete with empirical studies on the relationship 
between governance variables of board size and corporate performance (Boone, 
Field, Karpoff & Raheja, 2007 and Lipton & Lorsch, 1992)); board composition 
and corporate performance (Guest, 2008); board gender diversity and corporate 
performance (Ilaboya & Izevbekhai and Monem, 2013) and board independence 
and corporate performance (Ting, 2011). Surprisingly, the core issue of what 
determines the size and composition of the corporate boards has not received 
serious empirical consideration except for developed economies where the issue 
has received sparse consideration. 
In the developing countries, and focusing on Nigeria and Malaysia, the 
issue of the determinants of board size and board composition is still in its 
infancy. It is this knowledge gap that motivated this current contribution. In 
addition, the need to test the universality of the factors which has featured in the 
sparse empirical literature formed the basis for the inclusion of Malaysia. By 
World Bank Index, Malaysia is on the same economic stratum with Nigeria. 
Against the above backdrop, the fundamental objective of this study is to 
carry out a comparative analysis of the determinants of board size and 
composition in the Nigerian and Malaysian listed banks. Our results revealed 
mixed reaction. First, In the Nigeria case, Firm size was positive and significant 
while in the case of Malaysian firms, size was negative and significant. The 
variable of free cash flow was negative in both instances, but while the 
relationship is significant in the Malaysia case, it is statistically insignificant in 
the case of Nigeria. 
The study made a modest contribution to knowledge. First, it has helped 
to bridge the gap in the extant literature in developing countries. Second, the 
inclusion of Malaysia-listed banks makes the study robust and allow for extensive 
generalization of the research result. To the best our knowledge, this appears to 
be the first shot at a comparative analysis using Nigeria and Malaysia. 
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REVIEW OF EMPIRICAL LITERATURE   
Board Size 
Board size is the total number of directors sitting on each company’s 
board. Several scholars have asserted that small boards operate more efficiently 
compared to large boards because of the high corporate costs and free rider 
problem associated with large boards. Lipton and Lorsch (1992, p. 65) argue that 
“when a board has more than ten members it becomes more difficult for them all 
to express their ideas and opinions”. Similarly, Jensen, (1993) are of the same 
view, and they concluded that the mean board size should be seven or eight 
people, beyond which they are less likely to function effectively. 
Larger board size has the advantage of increased monitoring. However, 
it leads to poor communication and poor decision which may impact negatively 
on the performance of the organisation Therefore, larger board size is not in the 
favour of the service firms (Amarjit & Mathur, 2011). The major advantage of 
larger boards is the presence of heterogeneous resources which may impact 
positively on the performance of the firm whether at the advisory (Haleblian & 
Firkelstein, 1993) or monitoring (Adres & Vallenlado, 2008).  
 
Board Composition  
Board composition is one of the important factors affecting firm 
financial performance. The relationship between board composition and firm 
performance is well documented in the extant literature. There are two strands of 
literature in this direction. First, the researches with the positive relationship 
(Callen, Klein & Tinkelman, 2003; Erhardt, Werbel & Shrader, 2003; Kang, 
Cheng & Gray, 2007 and the researches with a negative relationship with firm 
performance ( Eisenberg, Sundgren, & Wells, 1998 and Garg, 2007). Hermalin 
and Weisbash (1991) find no significant relationship. In this study, we measure 
board composition as the proportion of non-executive directors to total directors 
on the board. Baysinger, Kosnick, and Turk (1991) have shown that a high ratio 
of non-executive directors to executive directors has a negative impact on 
corporate entrepreneurship. Moreover, they find that research and development 
spending increase as a result of a higher executive (insider) representation on 
boards. 
 
Firm Size and Board Size and Composition: 
Firm size refers to the size of a firm and it is measured by the natural 
logarithm of each firm’s total assets for each year under review. Even though the 
size of the firm can also be proxy using the logarithm of the firm’ revenue  or the 
total number of the firm’ employee for the period under review. Using bank size 
as a proxy for complexity, Ting (2011) found a positive relationship between 
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bank size and board size. The positive relationship was justified by the scope of 
operation hypothesis which posits larger board size for more complex firms. 
Leaning on the same assumption (Boone, Field, Karpoff & Raheja, 2007) and 
Guest ,2008) also found a positive relationship between firm size and board size. 
Larger companies are involved in more diverse activities, increase external 
contracting higher geographical spread and involved in more cases of mergers 
and acquisition. These activities are likely to result in more intense monitoring 
which will require more numbers of directors. Hence, a positive relationship is 
said to exist between firm size and board size (Lehn, Patro & Zao, 2009; Linck & 
Yang, 2008; Monem, 2013 and Ting, 2011) 
On the relationship between firm size and board composition, it is 
expected that as the size and operation of the firm increases, more outside 
directors are required to monitor effectively, the activities of the organisation 
Lehn, Patro, and Zhao (2005); Herrmalin and Weisbach (1988) find a significant 
positive relationship between firm size and board composition. 
The above review revealed a concentration of empirical literature in the 
developed economies. This paucity of empirical literature in the developing 
countries creates a knowledge gap in the extant literature which makes the issue 
inconclusive and open to further debate. This research gap forms the basis of our 
first proposition. 
Proposition I: There is no significant relationship between firm size 
and board size and composition. 
 
Firm Age and Board Size and Composition 
Firm age is viewed from two perspectives: the number of years a 
company has been in operation and secondly as the number of years from 
incorporation. For purposes of the current study, the latter definition of firm age 
was adopted. From casual empiricism, and drawing inspiration from the scale of 
operation hypothesis, it is expected that older and more established firms have a 
reputation which is likely to require more effective monitoring and by implication 
higher number of directors. Age helps to consolidate the competitive advantage of 
the firm (Arrow, 1962 and Jovanovic, 1982). Older firms have well established 
strategic planning and mechanism for effective scanning of the environment of 
business which reduces the extent of monitoring and by implication, reduces the 
number of directors. Therefore, a negative relationship exists between firm age 
and board size (Khalid, 2014 and Mohan-Neil, 1995). To the contrary, other 
researchers establish a positive relationship between firm age and board size. This 
means older firms require more monitoring due to increase cost of transactions, 
higher executive compensation and decreasing profit margin (Boone et al 2007; 
Linck, Netter & Yang 2008 and Ting, 2011). 
On the relationship between firm age and the ratio of outside directors, it 
is established that age can result in obsolete strategy as a consequence of the 
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inability of the organization to respond to change, which according to Agarwal 
and Gort, 1996 can result in organizational decay. With organizational 
inflexibilities, older firms become less competitive, and this may require the 
presence of more outside directors for effective repositioning and re-engineering 
of the operations of the firm. Boone et al (2007) report a positive and significant 
relationship between firm age and board composition. Even though in the study 
of Ting (2011), the relationship is positive but insignificant. From the above 
review, there is hardly any case addressing developing countries. In addition, the 
relationship between firm age and board size and board composition remain 
largely unsettled as a result of conflicting reports. These limitations form the 
basis of our second proposition: 
Proposition II: There is no significant relationship between firm age 
board size and composition. 
 
Firm Leverage and Board Size and Composition 
Firm leverage refers to the extent of external financing in the capital 
structure of the organization. Large boards are known to pressure management to 
reduce the scope of debt financing in the organization. Reduced leverage will 
lessen the extent of monitoring. Hence, Abor and Biekpe (2007); Hasan, (2009) 
and Khalid, 2014 find a negative relationship between leverage and board size. 
Conversely, there is also the angle of the inability of the board to reach a 
consensus agreement on the need to reduce the extent of external financing. With 
higher leverage level, there is the need for more board members for effective 
monitoring. This portends a positive relationship between leverage and board 
size. This position is supported by Booth and Deli (1999), Bushman, Chen, Engel 
and Smith (2004 Hussainey and Al-Nodel (2009); Jensen (1993); Lasfer, (2004); 
Lipton and Lorch (1992); and Loderer and Peyer (2002), who find a positive 
relationship between leverage and board size.  
Higher external financing creates the need for more monitoring and by 
implication more independent directors. Leverage increases board composition as 
outside directors are required to bring in their expertise in finance issues. 
Therefore, instead of replacing existing independent directors, more independent 
directors with the requisite expertise are injected into the board. Hence, a positive 
relationship exists between leverage and board composition (Booth & Deli 
(1999); Coles et al (2008); Klein (1998); Monem (2013) and Pfeffer (1972). Even 
though Ferreira and Kirchamier (2011) find a negative relationship between 
leverage and board composition and board size. 
Proposition III: There is no significant relationship between firm 
leverage and board size and composition. 
Firm Free Cash Flow and Board Size and Composition 
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As the name implies, free cash flow is the proportion of the firm’ capital 
not committed to operational activities. According to Ting (2011), when there is 
high free cash flow, it is better to increase board size and composition to ensure 
effective monitoring and control. We measure firm free cash as net operating cash 
flow less capital investments divided by total assets. According to Jensen (1986), 
firm free cash flow is a measure of the potential private benefits available to 
managers. Boone et al (2007); Monem (2013) and Ting (2011) find a significant 
positive relationship between free cash flows and board size and composition 
when there is increase benefit from monitoring, but the relationship is negative 
where the cost of monitoring increases (Raheja, 2005). The above formed the 
basis of our fourth proposition: 
Proposition IV: There is no significant relationship between firm free 
cash flow and board size and composition. 
 
Firm Performance and Board Size and Composition 
In this study we proxy performance using the ratio of return on assets. 
Guest (2008) examined the relationship between firm profitability measured by 
ROA and board size and composition. The study used firm operating performance 
to proxy for CEO influence. The result of the study is a negative and statistically 
significant relationship between profitability and board size at the 1% level. In the 
same vein, Ting 2011) find a significant negative relationship between 
profitability and board size. It is established that smaller boards are more 
cohesive, and this allows for effective monitoring (Coles et al, 2008; Eisenberg et 
al, 1998; Yermack, 1996). The relationship between profitability and board 
composition is also negative and consistent with the negotiation hypothesis (Ting, 
2011; Harris & Raviv, 2008). Even though there is well-established negative 
relationship between profitability and board size and composition, the issue 
remains largely unsettled as a result of the paucity of empirical literature 
addressing developing economies. Our fifth proposition is thus: 
Proposition V: There is no significant relationship between firm 
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METHODOLOGY  
Analytical Framework and Model Specification  
The framework for the analysis of the determinants of board size and 
composition is premised on two theories; scope of operation hypothesis and 
monitoring hypothesis. The formal emphasis is on the fact that as firm’s scope of 
operation increases, complexity sets in, and the problem of agency also increases, 
leading to an incremental alteration in its board size and proportion of non-
executive directors. According to the scope of operation hypothesis, since larger 
or more complex processes lead to larger and more hierarchical firms and the 
firms’ boards, in turn, are liable for the ratification and monitoring of senior 
managers’ action and verdicts, the information requirements of more complex 
operations require larger boards as well as larger representation of non-executive 
directors on the boards (Boone et al., 2007). Firm size, age, and leverage are the 
variables used to explain a firm’s scope and complexity of operations. 
On the other hand, Monitoring Hypothesis view structure of corporate 
boards as a function of the benefit and cost of advising and monitoring (Boone et 
al., 2007). While board size and the fraction of non-executive directors increase 
with the benefit of monitoring and advising, they decrease with the cost of 
monitoring (Ting, 2011). According to the monitoring hypothesis, the net benefits 
of extra monitoring increase with managers’ opportunities to consume private 
benefits but decrease with monitoring cost (Boone et al., 2007). A measure of 
manager’s potential private benefits to test the monitoring hypothesis is firm free 
cash flow. 
Within these hypotheses lies the agency theory and stewardsip theories 
in clarifying the relationship between managers and resource owners. Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) aggregated the issue of separation of ownership from control 
into the agency problem. Agency theory refers to the set of propositions in 
directing the affairs of the modern organization with number of people, which 
allow for separate individuals to control and direct the use of their collective 
resources to achieve the objective of profit maximization. The board of directors 
is appointed by the owners as a governance solution to the more hazards of 
managers. The external directors are appointed to ensure objectivity in the 
activities of the internal board. The stewardship theory was propounded  by 
Donaldson and Davis in (1991) as a new direction in crystalising the relationship 
between managers and resource owners. The theory holds that there is no conflict 
of interest between managers and resource oowners and that the objective of 
corporate governance is to find the mechanism amd structure that facilitates the 
most effective coordination between the parties (Donaldson, 1990). The theory 
posits that managers act in consonance with the interest of resource owners. 
Against the above backdrop and in line with extant literature, we expect 
a significant relationship between firm size, firm age and firm leverage. 
Therefore, in a functional form; 
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BSIZE = f(firm size, firm age and leverage)                (i) 
In the same vein, the monitoring hypothesis and some existing empirical 
studies (Ting,2011 & Boone et al.,2007) posit a significant relationship between 
free cash flows and board size. Therefore, 
BSIZE = f(free cash flows)                                                               (ii) 
Beyond the scope of operation and monitoring hypothesis, negotiation 
hypothesis posits a significant relationship between profitability and board size.  
Therefore; 
BSIZE = f(profitability)                                                                      (iii) 
Collecting equation (i), (ii) & (iii) in a functional form, we have: 
BSIZE = f(firm size, firm age, leverage and free cash flow)             (iv) 
Equation IV is transformed into econometric form as: 
BSIZEit = β0 + β1 FSIZEit + β2 FAGEit + β3 LEVit + β4 FCASHFLit + β5 
PAT_MARGINit +it                                                                                     (v) 
It is presumptively expected that β1, β2, . . ., β5> 0  
 
In the same vein, it is expected that the same variable should determine 
board composition in Nigerian and Malaysian quoted companies. Therefore, our 
second model is given as: 
BCOMit = β0 + β1 FSIZEit + β2 FAGEit + β3 LEVit + β4 FCASHFLit + β5 
PAT_MARGINit +it                        (v1) 
Where: BCOM = Board composition; FSIZE = Firm size; FAGE = Firm age; 
LEV = Leverage; FCASH = Firm cashflow; PAT_MARGIN = 
Profitability.  
It is presumptively expected that:  
β 1, β 2, β3, β4, β5> 0 from theory and extant literature. 
 
Research Design 
The population of the study is a combination of banks listed on the 
Nigerian and Malaysian Bursa as at 2014. A sample of 18 banks and the banks 
were purposively selected from the universe of banks listed on the Malaysian and 
Nigerian Stock Exchanges. It is purposive because the banks were chosen based 
on the availability of annual reports up to 2014 accounting year.   
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Data Estimation Techniques 
We estimated the regression data using the panel regression method.   
The justification for using panel data regression is that it gives a large number of 
data points, increasing the degrees of freedom and reducing the collinearity 
among explanatory variables. The research design adopted in this study is a 
combination of the time series and cross-sectional analysis. The usual regression 
assumption tests were effected. We tested for normality using the Jarque-Bera 
test; heteroskedasticity using the Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey test; model 
misspecification using the Ramsey RESET test and multicollinearity using the 
test of variance inflation factor.  
 
ESTIMATION RESULT AND DISCUSSION 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1A 
Results of the Descriptive Statistics (Nigerian Listed Firms) 
 BSIZE BCOMP FSIZE FAGE LEVERAGE FCASHF PAT_MARGIN 
 Mean  14.58163  0.608020  8.883457  16.42857  0.904183 -0.057041  0.059240 
 Median  15.00000  0.600000  8.936246  10.00000  0.851500 -0.037500  0.058000 
 Maximum  20.00000  0.727000  9.534511  44.00000  8.878000  0.605000  0.598000 
 Minimum  7.000000  0.500000  8.045251  2.000000  0.001000 -0.937000 -0.265000 
 Std. Dev.  2.359117  0.058018  0.336776  13.61700  0.842190  0.172749  0.076696 
 Skewness -0.623702  0.006248 -0.406235  0.947554  8.736213 -1.033134  2.816904 
 Kurtosis  4.550566  2.008801  2.501649  2.392866  83.76485  10.78774  29.57661 
        
 Jarque-Bera  16.17112  4.012408  3.709548  16.17018  27882.00  265.0834  3013.728 
 Probability  0.000308  0.134498  0.156488  0.000308  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
        
 Sum  1429.000  59.58600  870.5788  1610.000  88.60990 -5.590000  5.805500 
 Sum Sq. Dev.  539.8469  0.326512  11.00154  17986.00  68.80062  2.894702  0.570586 
        
Observations  98  98  98  98  98  98  98 
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Table 1B 
Results of the Descriptive Statistics (Malaysian Listed Firms) 
 FAGE BSIZE BCOMP LEVERAGE FCASHF PAT_MARGIN FSIZE 
 Mean  37.23810  8.126984  0.471280  0.394927  0.123821  0.182949  5.850752 
 Median  25.00000  8.000000  0.454500  0.288350  0.059400  0.091200  5.841653 
 Maximum  96.00000  15.00000  1.010000  1.027700  3.333300  0.997700  7.079181 
 Minimum  3.000000  3.000000  0.166700  0.000900 -0.613000 -0.713200  4.431364 
 Std. Dev.  25.65788  2.386576  0.128343  0.308727  0.382563  0.250374  0.584279 
 Skewness  0.908394  0.278015  0.683234  0.712006  4.821970  1.102169  0.382745 
 Kurtosis  2.791874  2.490200  4.628218  2.118569  40.97596  5.316799  2.748148 
        
 Jarque-Bera  17.55619  2.987595  23.72123  14.72483  8059.692  53.68998  3.409368 
 Probability  0.000154  0.224518  0.000007  0.000635  0.000000  0.000000  0.181830 
        
 Sum  4692.000  1024.000  59.38130  49.76076  15.60140  23.05153  737.1947 
 Sum Sq. Dev.  82290.86  711.9683  2.059006  11.91403  18.29433  7.835918  42.67274 
        
 Observations  126  126  126  126  126  126  126 
 Source: Researchers computation (E-VIEWS 8) 2015 
 
The results of the descriptive statistics show that the regression variables 
follow the standard normal distribution. Except f the variable of board 
composition in the Nigeria case and the variable of board size in the Malaysian 
case, the regression variables reported very high Jarque-Bera values and their 
respective probability values were significant. The mean board size of Nigerian 
Banks is 15 directors compared to 8 directors in the case of Malaysian Banks. 
The average age of Nigerian Banks is 16 years compared to Malaysian banks 
with a mean age of 37 years. With relatively small standard deviation values, the 
regression variables in both cases are clustered around their respective mean 
values. The ratio of independent Directors to internal Directors is 61% in the 
Nigerian case compared to about 47% in the case of Malaysian Banks. However, 
the margin of profit is higher in Malaysian banks with an average of 18% 
compared to about 6% in the case of Nigeria Banks. Both cases reported positive 
skewness which indicates that the data are skewed to the right as reported in the 
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Table 2A 
Results of the Correlation Coefficient (Nigerian Banks) 
Covariance Analysis: Ordinary      
Date: 09/29/15   Time: 09:41      
Sample: 1 98       
Included observations: 98      
Correlation       
t-Statistic       
Probability BSIZE BCOMP FSIZE FAGE LEVERAGE FCASHF  PAT_MARGIN  
BSIZE  1.000000       
 -----       
 -----       
        
BCOMP  -0.072772 1.000000      
 -0.714915 -----      
 0.4764 -----      
        
FSIZE  0.308292 -0.495074 1.000000     
 3.175299 -5.582915 -----     
 0.0020 0.0000 -----     
        
FAGE  0.217447 -0.055953 0.161842 1.000000    
 2.182761 -0.549086 1.606909 -----    
 0.0315 0.5842 0.1114 -----    
        
LEVERAGE  0.024763 0.010338 0.068910 -0.109842 1.000000   
 0.242702 0.101297 0.676786 -1.082782 -----   
 0.8088 0.9195 0.5002 0.2816 -----   
        
FCASHF  -0.002618 -0.065610 0.260266 -0.105374 0.053970 1.000000  
 -0.025647 -0.644235 2.641093 -1.038231 0.529565 -----  
 0.9796 0.5210 0.0096 0.3018 0.5976 -----  
        
PAT_MARGIN 0.030758 -0.076592 0.100878 -0.093457 -0.055037 0.156634 1.000000 
 0.301511 -0.752661 0.993469 -0.919711 -0.540070 1.553873 -----  
 0.7637 0.4535 0.3230 0.3600 0.5904 0.1235 -----  
Source: Researchers computation (E-VIEWS 8) 2015 
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Table 2B 
Results of the Correlation Coefficient (Malaysian Banks) 
Covariance Analysis: Ordinary 
      
Date: 12/05/15   Time: 10:46      
Sample: 2008 2014       
Included observations: 126      
Correlation       
t-Statistic       
Probability FAGE BSIZE BCOMP LEVERAGE FCASHF PAT_MARGIN FSIZE 
FAGE  1.000000       
 -----       
 -----       
        
BSIZE  -0.231217 1.000000      
 -2.646440 -----      
 0.0092 -----      
        
BCOMP  0.026089 -0.226887 1.000000     
 0.290617 -2.594161 -----     
 0.7718 0.0106 -----     
        
LEVERAGE  -0.009897 0.249875 0.029253 1.000000    
 -0.110211 2.873642 0.325885 -----    
 0.9124 0.0048 0.7451 -----    
        
FCASHF  0.067200 -0.018740 0.005552 -0.039530 1.000000   
 0.750007 -0.208715 0.061825 -0.440529 -----   
 0.4547 0.8350 0.9508 0.6603 -----   
        
PAT_MARGIN  -0.036210 -0.213899 -0.027981 0.149918 0.140244 1.000000  
 -0.403488 -2.438308 -0.311701 1.688500 1.577274 -----  
 0.6873 0.0162 0.7558 0.0938 0.1173 -----  
        
FSIZE  -0.456298 0.211059 -0.069765 -0.155873 -0.115032 -0.110847 1.000000
 -5.710238 2.404413 -0.778765 -1.757209 -1.289498 -1.241999 ----- 
 0.0000 0.0177 0.4376 0.0814 0.1996 0.2166 ----- 
Source: Researchers computation (E-VIEWS 8) 2015 
 
The correlation coefficients were mixed in both cases, with some 
variables positively correlated with the dependent variables and others negatively 
correlated with the dependent variable. In the Nigerian case, only free cash flow 
is negatively related to board size and only leverage is negatively related to board 
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composition. In the case of Malaysian banks, firm size and leverage are positively 
related to board size while profit margin and firm size are negatively correlated 
with board composition. In the case of Nigerian banks, the highest coefficient of 
correlation is 0.308292 between firm size and board size, while in the case of 
Malaysian banks, the highest coefficient of correlation 0.249875 between 
leverage and board size. Consistent with Bryman and Cramer (1997), none of the 
cases posed a problem of multicollinearity. The result of the absence of 
multicollinearity is further strengthened by the outcome of the test of variance 
inflation factor in Appendix 2. 
 
Regression Diagnostics 
In both cases, the normal regression assumption tests were effected to 
ensure the accuracy of the regression models. The result of the Ramsey RESET 
test shows the accuracy of the regression models with probability values of 
0.1358 in the Nigerian case and 0.0727 in the Malaysian case respectively. The 
centered VIF values of both instances have average values of 1.155165 (Nigerian 
banks) and 1.154528 (Malaysian banks) respectively. The implication is the 
absence of multicollinearity which further strengthened the result of the 
coefficient of correlation as reported in tables 2. The Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey test 
of heteroskedasticity reported in Appendix 3 shows that the residuals are 
homoscedastic, having reported probability values of 0.0798 (Nigerian banks) 
and 0.4227 (Malaysian banks) respectively. 
 
Results of Panel Regression  
Table 3 
Analysis of Regression Results 
 NIGERIAN BANKS  MALAYSIAN BANKS 




    FEM 
MODEL 1(BSIZE) 














































































R2 0.448964 0.509054 0.900359 0.440034 
Adjusted R2 0.408059 0.397193 0.879076 0.300035 
Durbin-Watson 
stat 
1.028262 1.460010 2.088930 1.492427 
Mean 
dependent var 
4.770850 0.608020 8.126984 3.157238 
S.E. of 
Regression 









Hausman test 0.3264 0.0103 0.05 0.2105 
Source: Researchers computation (E-VIEWS 8) 2015.      At 5% level of 
significance 
 
Estimation 1: Deerminants of Board Size 
In the Nigerian case, the adjusted R-squared value is 0.408059 implying 
that about 41% of the cross-sectional variation in the dependent variable of board 
size is accounted for by the explanatory variables of firm size, firm age, leverage, 
free cash flow and profit margin. The Hausman statistic of 0.3264 shows a 
preference for random effect model. The F-statistic of 0.017401 shows that a 
significant positive relationship exists between the dependent and the independent 
variables. 
The variables of firm size and firm age are positive and statistically 
significant at the 5% level. This implies that board size increases with increase in 
firm age and firm size. This finding is consistent with Boone et al. (2007), Linck 
et al. (2008) and Ting (2011) who found a positive and significant relationship 
between firm age and board size and Boone et al. (2007), Guest (2008), Lehn et 
al. (2005), Monem (2013) and Ting (2011) who found significant relationship 
between firm size and board size. The positive impact of firm size on the size of 
the board is justified by the stewardship theory which requires larger board to 
effectively oversee the activities of the firm. 
The variables of leverage and free cash flow were found to be negative 
but statistically insignificant which means as leverage and free cash flow 
increases, the board size decreases. The findings corroborate the reports of 
Ferraira and Kirchmaier (2013) who found a negative relationship between 
leverage and board size. 
In the Malaysian case, there was a preference for fixed effect model with 
a Hausman test of 0.05. The F-statistics of 42.30484 and the associated 
probability of 0.00000 show a significant linear relationship between the 
dependent and explanatory variables. The adjusted R-squared value shows that 
about 88% of the systematic variation in board size is accounted for the 
explanatory variables. 
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The variables of free cash flow and firm size were found to be negative 
and statistically significant having reported t-values of -2.218121 and -2.030709 
respectively. The result is consistent with the study of Yermack (1996) who 
reported a negative relationship between firm size and board size and the study of 
Ting (2011), Boone et al. (2007) who reported a negative relationship between 
free cash flow and board size. The variables of leverage and profit margin were 
both positive and insignificant. 
 
Estimation 2: Determinants of Board Composition 
The Hausman test of the Nigerian case of the determinants of board 
composition shows a preference for fixed effect model. The result shows that 
about 40% of the systematic variation in board composition is accounted for by 
the explanatory variables of firm size, firm age, leverage and profit margin. The 
F-statistic of 4.550764 and the probability of 0.000001 imply a significant linear 
relationship between the dependent and explanatory variables. 
The regression result reports a significant positive relationship between 
free cash flow and firm age. This means an increase in free cash flow and firm 
age, increases the composition of the board. The result is consistent with the 
study of Ting (2011), Boone et al. (2007) and Monem (2013) who found a 
significant positive relationship between free cash flow and board composition. In 
the same vein, the report corroborates the study of Linck et al. (2008), Ting 
(2011), Boone et al. (2007) and Monem (2013) who found a positive relationship 
between firm age and board composition. 
The study finds a significant negative relationship between the variable 
of firm size and board composition, having reported a robust t-value of -2.781570 
and associated probability value of 0.0068. The result is consistent with Barclay 
and Smith (1995) who found a similar result. The negative relationship between 
firm size and board composition is explained within the confines of the agency 
theory. Firms choose a moderate composition depending on the availability of 
alternative mechanisms in checking the moral hazards of management. 
In the case of Malaysian banks, the Hausman test revealed a preference 
for random effect model with a value of 0.2105. The explanatory variables 
accounted for about 30% of the cross-sectional variation in board composition 
and the F-statistic of 8.000877 shows significant linear relationship between 
board composition and the regressors. 
Firm size was found to be positive and significant with a robust t-value 
of 2.017237 and a probability value of 0.045. The implication of the finding is 
that as firm size increases, it increases the extent of external board members. The 
result is consistent with the findings of Ting (2011) and Boone et al. (2007) who 
found positive relationship between firm size and board composition. The 
variables of free cash flow and profit margin were negative and statistically 
insignificant. 
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CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The broad objective of the study is to investigate the determinants of 
board size and composition in Nigerian and Malaysian quoted banks over 2008 – 
2014. It is observed that a positive and significant relationship exist between the 
dependent and independent variables. The variable of firm size and firm age are 
positive and significant. And it was also observed that firm size and board size 
are positive and have a significant relationship. There exists a negative and 
significant relationship between the leverage and free cash flow.  
 In the Malaysian case, there exists a significant linear relationship 
between the dependent and explanatory variables. A negative and significant 
relationship exists between free cash flow and firm size.  
 Finally, a positive and insignificant relationship exists between leverage 
and profit margin. Against this backdrop of the empirical findings, the following 
recommendations were advanced: Large firms should have a larger board size. 
This will ensure that more resources, ideas are pooled together to ensure the 
efficient management of the firms. As a firm grows older in age which 
presupposes that it engages in a more complex operation, the number of directors 
of such firm should be increased. This increment will also ensure the effective 
management of the firm. As firm free cash flow increases, the fraction of outside 
board members should be increased. Increase in free cash flow increases the 
potentials for private benefits available to managers which inturn increases the 
possibility for moral hazards  in line with the agency theory. Therefore, to 
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ODREDNICE VELIČINE I SASTAVA UPRAVE: 
KOMPARATIVNA STUDIJA NIGERIJSKIH I 
MALEZIJSKIH KOMPANIJA KOJE KOTIRAJU NA 
BURZI    
 
Sažetak 
Cilj je istraživanja ispitati odrednice veličine i sastava uprave u nigerijskim i 
malezijskim bankama koje kotiraju na burzama. Sudionici su istraživanja banke 
koje kotiraju na nigerijskim i malezijskim burzama na dan 31. prosinca 2014. 
Uzorak od četrnaest (14) banaka u Nigeriji i osamnaest (18) u Maleziji ciljano je 
odabran za istraživanje. U istraživanju se koristio model panel regresije koji se 
temelji na kvaliteti nepristranosti, povećanoj točki podataka i kontroli 
heterogenosti. Kako bi se provjerila točnost modela, koristili su se standardni 
testovi regresijske pretpostavke normalnosti, heteroskedastičnosti, serijske 
korelacije i multikolinearnosti. Istraživanje je pokazalo značajnu vezu između 
veličine tvrtke te veličine i sastava uprave. Utjecaj veličine tvrtke na veličinu 
uprave pozitivan je u slučaju Nigerije, a negativan u Maleziji. Utjecaj na sastav 
uprave pozitivan je u Maleziji, ali negativan u Nigeriji. Odnos između slobodnog 
novčanog tijeka i veličine uprave negativan je, ali značajan samo u slučaju 
Malezije. Utjecaj slobodnog novčanog tijeka na sastav uprave pozitivan je samo 
u Nigeriji. Mješoviti rezultat između veličine tvrtke te veličine i sastava uprave 
poziva na srednje velike tvrtke. Povećani slobodni novčani tijek povećava 
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potencijal za privatnu korist i poziva na veći omjer vanjskih u odnosu na 
unutarnje članove uprave za učinkovitije praćenje.        
Ključne riječi: sastav odbora, veličina odbora, slobodni novčani tijekovi, godina 
osnivanja tvrtke, veličina tvrtke   
JEL klasifikacija: G32, G34, L25 
 
